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Moral Disagreement and Audi’s Account of Moral Intuitionism
By Dustin Michael Sigsbee
Department of Philosophy
dustin.m.sigsbee@wmich.edu
In Moral Perception Robert Audi lays out an intuitionist account of moral perception
where a moral agent of the proper disposition can use emotion and intuition as a means of
supporting or justifying knowledge concerning certain moral truths or propositions. lvii This,
however, opens Audi’s account up to possible cases of moral disagreement, since emotion and
intuition can vary from agent to agent regarding some particular moral propositions and,
furthermore, neither agent would be better disposed to claim priority for his (justifying)
emotion or intuition over that of the other agent. For this reason, I argue that agents in this
intuitionist picture ought to remain epistemically agnostic towards any moral proposition that
they and a relevant epistemic/moral peer actually disagree upon.
Section I: Emotion and Intuition as Justification of Moral Judgment
To begin, Audi claims that intuition and emotion can be a major factor in justifying claims
regarding the truth of moral propositions. Ultimately, the process involves intuition and
emotion leading us to make justified moral judgments.
Nesting justification in something like judgment, instead of merely belief, is very
important for Audi’s account. While both belief and judgment can cause an agent to be
motivated to act, judgment is taken to be a better form of motivation for actions on Audi’s
account. Audi also considers judgment to be capable of bringing our beliefs into “sharper
focus”, presumably because judgment is typically considered to be a conscious inferential
process which could make more salient the fact that an agent believes p. Lastly, judgment can
and typically does include reflection, another means of bringing our beliefs into “sharper
focus”.lviii For these reasons moral judgment, which typically entails belief formation one way
or the other regarding the object of the judgment, is taken to be a central component of
justification on this account.
It is evident on Audi’s account that emotion and intuition are supposed to provide
justification by going through this process of judgment and reflection, with the agent
ultimately coming to judge the proposition in question as being either true or false. It is,
however, much more difficult to see exactly how this is supposed to be accomplished. To be
sure, there is no set way in which intuition and emotion justify moral judgment. Instead, there
is a sort of general process by which intuition and emotion do so. I will attempt a brief sketch
of this process below.
To start, we have some intuition or emotion regarding some moral proposition and its
truth value. In some instances we may not feel as certain regarding some intuitions and
emotions as we would others and because of this we refrain from making a decision one way
or the other regarding that proposition. Instead, we reflect on the truth value of that
proposition in order to come to some resolution of the matter. As Audi notes, reflection can
provide adequate resolution, “…by evoking supporting or opposing intuitions, by leading us
to a theoretical analysis, by providing premises that confirm or disconfirm the initial intuition,
or in other ways.”lix
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Section II: The Problem of Disagreement
Even if we accept Audi’s account at face value we are still presented with the problem of
disagreement. The problem is this: if emotion and intuition are means of coming to moral
knowledge and, furthermore, emotion and intuition are taken to provide justification for the
judgments we make, then how are we supposed to understand disagreement about (justified)
moral judgments? Presumably, on an objectivist account such as Audi’s, there will be a fact of
the matter as to whether it is true or false that moral proposition p holds, but in what way are
we justified in claiming that we know p if the basis for that justification is, in part, constitutive
of the moral judgments we disagree upon? To be clear there are, of course, different kinds of
disagreement we ought to consider.
The relevant kind of disagreement for this discussion is content-specific disagreement.
Content-specific disagreement concerns disagreement regarding the content of a given
proposition. Furthermore, content-specific disagreement can be categorized in the following
way: as propositional or attributive disagreement. Propositional disagreement is a very
common kind of disagreement characterized by at least two agents holding contrary views on
a given proposition. For instance, I hold that p and my colleague holds that not p. Attributive
disagreement, on the other hand, is characterized by at least two agents holding contrary
views on any given proposition because they have attributed or predicated different qualities
to the thing in question. There are additional kinds of disagreement, but for the purpose of this
paper we will only be concerned with propositional disagreement.
There is also the issue of the relevant epistemic peer necessary for the sort of
disagreement I am talking about to be a problem. If two individuals disagree, this by itself
may not be enough for the disagreement to cause any real problem, since it could be the case
that the two individuals disagreeing are not peers in the relevant sense. An example of this is
when a child and the child’s grandparent disagree regarding some moral proposition. The
child’s disagreement should not be enough to raise suspicion in the grandparent about his
intuition regarding the moral proposition in question. For our purposes epistemic peers must
at least be “…(a) equally rational and equally thoughtful and (b) have considered the same
relevant evidence equally conscientiously.” lx This is generally called epistemic parity. In
situations where we have epistemic parity and disagreement persists despite equally
conscientious consideration of the other agent’s position we have instances of problematic
disagreement.
Section III: Audi’s Solution to Propositional Disagreement
One possible solution Audi proposes is that we solve moral propositional disagreement
through recourse to our moral perceptions. According to Audi “…moral perceptions, are
responsive to the properties that determine moral truths, and moral emotions and often reflect
such truths.”lxi Surely this seems fine, but we are left with an issue even if we accept that
moral perceptions sometimes latch on to moral truths.
Suppose two agents disagree on the truth value of a given proposition and attempt to
solve the disagreement through moral perception. Moral perception on Audi’s account is not
similar to non-moral perception, in that moral perception concerns what Audi calls
perceptible properties instead of perceptual properties. Perceptible properties are not all
sensory and can be normative, while perceptual properties are all sensory and non-normative.
Since perceptible properties are not all sensory this leaves open the possibility that some of
them are sensory, but Audi does not seem to take this approach. Here is an example of how
Audi speaks about perceiving injustice:
One might think that the phenomenal elements in perception properly so called must be
sensory in the representational way that characterizes paradigms of seeing and some of
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the other four ordinary senses. But why should we expect perception of injustice, which
is a normative, non-sensory phenomenon, to be just like perception of color, shape,
flavor, or sound, which are physical or in any case sensory and non-normative?lxii

So, perception of a moral property is not properly sensory. Since this is the case
disputants have nothing sensory to point to during a disagreement. On Audi’s account we can
have moral knowledge, but it seems much more difficult (nigh impossible) to provide proper
justification for such claims when confronted with the relevant disagreement. Assuming the
dispute is between genuine epistemic peers, appeal to perception will bring the disputants no
closer to reaching an agreement, but instead pushes the issue back from moral judgments, to
moral intuitions or emotions, further back to moral perceptions.
Another approach that Audi hints at is an appeal to moral expertise. In the final sections
of his work Moral Perception Audi mentions that ethical theory and aesthetics are analogous
in many ways. One of the ways in which ethical theory and aesthetics are analogous, Audi
contends, lies in the conditions necessary to come to well-founded judgments. As criteria for
the well-foundedness of judgments Audi invokes Hume’s ideal aesthetic judge. The famous
passage from Of the Standard of Taste explicates certain features:
[S]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by
comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, [which] can alone entitle critics to this valuable
character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are found, is the true standard of
taste and beauty.lxiii
I think that this approach fails for the same reasons an appeal to perception fails to
adjudicate disagreement. Suppose that two ethical judges disagree on the truth value of a
given moral proposition. What recourse would these two have to solve their disagreement?
Pointing to experience in comparison, intuitions, or emotions, which originally justified the
judgment of the ethical judge, are all properly non-sensory and provide no way to properly
adjudicate the matter if disagreement persists.
Section IV: Epistemic Agnosticism and Possible Problems
In Sarah McGrath’s piece “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise” she mentions a passage
from Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, which goes as follows:
[I]f I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with a judgment
of some other mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to
suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between the two
judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of neutrality. lxiv
McGrath calls a belief that satisfies Sidgwick’s condition CONTROVERSIAL.lxv To be sure
a CONTROVERSIAL belief involves two relevantly disposed agents engaging in (propositional)
disagreement, such that if either agent has good reason to think the other is an epistemic or
moral peer, then both suspend judgment. If the agents in question are not actually peers then a
disputed belief is not CONTROVERSIAL. Recall the example I mentioned earlier of the child and
the grandparent disagreeing regarding some moral proposition. This is an example of a
disputed moral belief or judgment, but not a CONTROVERSIAL belief or judgment.
The judgments that are subject to propositional disagreement which I have been
discussing are the ones which I believe suffer from being CONTROVERSIAL judgments.
Furthermore, I think that if a judgment (or belief) is CONTROVERSIAL in this sense, then these
judgments cannot amount to knowledge because one of the aspects of being a
CONTROVERSIAL judgment, in my view, is that CONTROVERSIAL judgments do not provide
justification for a belief simply because we have no good reason to place more credence on
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our own intuitions than another agent’s intuitions, given that the relevant kind of
disagreement actually crops up.lxvi
I think it is important to note that there are objections to this skeptical position regarding
disagreement. I will canvas a few of them here. First, some philosophers question how this
notion of epistemic agnosticism translates into areas other than morality. For instance, Russ
Shafer-Landau argues that taking this position calls into question all of our beliefs or
judgments regarding philosophical positions and factual claims as foundational as “There
exists an external world.” since, as Shafer-Landau interprets the skeptic, all it takes is one
agent who vehemently disagrees with any other agent, which would then give the first agent
grounds to claim that we should be epistemically agnostic towards whatever position is
disagreed upon and remain so until disagreement is resolved.lxvii Although this consequence
seems appropriate considering the skeptic’s charge, I am more inclined to think otherwise. As
McGrath notes, with “…a more charitable construal of ... [the skeptic’s] challenge, it is the
fact that there is a substantial division of opinion with respect to controversial moral questions
that undermines the possibility of knowing the answers to those questions.” lxviii So, it need not
be the case that skepticism in the moral realm translates into any other realm, philosophical or
otherwise, but this position need not preclude such skepticism either. lxix
Second, Catherine Elgin maintains that we cannot voluntarily withhold (or make, for that
matter) a given belief, since the act of forming a belief is not a voluntary one. Furthermore,
Elgin accepts the notion that stating an agent ought to ϕ implies that that agent can in fact ϕ. If
both of these premises are true, then this seems to be the strongest case against epistemic
agnosticism or moderation, as Elgin calls it, since if it is the case that one cannot voluntarily
form a belief or refrain from doing so, then it does not follow that one ought to. lxx
Although this is the case it is far from clear as to whether or not one is precluded from
remaining indifferent regarding any specific judgment or belief. Furthermore, Elgin’s solution
to the problem is to push the argument back to acceptance of a given proposition, which is
voluntary, instead of belief in a given proposition, which she holds to be involuntary.
Elgin maintains that this position has general beneficial effects for the epistemology of
disagreement literature, which includes a means of distinguishing between doxastic rationality
and practical rationality. With regards to the problem I am attempting to address however, I
think that one could merely accept Elgin’s new dichotomy of acceptance as voluntary and
belief as involuntary and build this into one’s epistemic policy without significant problems.
The last objection I will mention to the sort of Sidgwickian epistemic agnosticism I am
advocating for is an internalist Bayesian approach developed by Ralph Wedgwood.
Wedgwood holds that, “…it is rational to have a “special sort” of trust in one’s own
intuitions, but it is not even possible to have the same sort of “trust” in the intuitions of
others.”lxxi This claim rests on the idea that our own intuitions can guide us to belief
formation, but the intuitions of others cannot have an exactly similar doxastic effect on us. If
this is true, then it does not necessarily follow that in every case of disagreement we need to
suspend judgment on the proposition we are disagreeing upon, but some of the time
suspension of judgment is the rational thing to do. So far, this sounds consistent with the sort
of epistemic agnosticism I am proposing. On my account you are not required to suspend
judgment in every case of disagreement, but only in those cases where an actual epistemic
peer is disagreeing with you. In this sense, Wedgwood’s position seems to be congruent with
mine.
What is markedly different about Wedgwood’s account is that what it is rational to do is
determined by our stock of conditional beliefs as well as some general epistemic principle,
such as Jeffrey conditionalizing. Wedgwood argues that it is the case that agents can respond
in a number of ways to disagreement. What is not clear from Wedgwood’s argument is that
either of the disputants are epistemic peers in any of the cases where the agents in question do
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anything but suspend judgment. More work will need to be done on what constitutes a
relevant epistemic peer, what doxastic effect another agent’s belief has on us, and how
background conditional beliefs play a role in belief formation.
Conclusion
I have argued that Audi’s intuitionist account of moral perception is faced with a problem
when the relevant epistemic peers engage in disagreement. First, I gave a brief sketch of
Audi’s position, including how intuition and emotion play a justificatory role in moral
judgments.
Then I raised the issue of disagreement and provided a brief sketch of a possible solution.
The solution I attempt to provide is Sidgwickian in nature, arguing that when presented with
the relevant kind of disagreement both agents’ ought to suspend judgment on the proposition
in question. Lastly, I mentioned three objections to the sort of epistemic agnosticism I am
proposing, none of which I consider to be fatal to this epistemic account.
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